Abstracts of Recent Cases by Alker, Richard Marion
ABSTRACTS
Due Process-Service of Process on Foreign Corporations
Petitioner, an Ohio corporation, was made a defendant in an
action for breach of contract by a resident of West Virginia. The
dispute resulted from an independent oral contract made to supple-
ment a written contract previously entered into in Ohio. The oral
contract was made by phone; petitioner making the offer in Ohio
and plaintiff accepting in this state. The contract was to be per-
formed in West Virginia. Petitioner had never qualified to do
business in this state, and none of its agents or officers entered this
state in connection with either the written or oral contract. Service
of process in the civil action was effected by delivery to the state
auditor. Petitioner sought to prevent the civil action from proceeding
to trial, claiming the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Held, writ
denied. A corporation doing business in this state is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state. A corporation is doing bus-
iness in this state when it enters into a contract to be performed in
whole or in part in this state. W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 71
(Michie 1961). The constitutional requirements of due process are
met when a foreign corporation has had contacts with a state
sufficient to make jurisdiction by that state reasonable. Petitioner,
by virtue of the contract in question, had sufficient contact to place
itself within the personal jurisdiction of the West Virginia court.
State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 131 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va.
1963).
In addition to granting jurisdiction based on contracts entered
into, the statute grants jurisdiction where a nonresident corporation
has committed a tort in whole or in part in the state.
This statute is representative of the latest stage in the evolution
of the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. The
progress of this evolution was carefully examined in Gavenda Bros.
v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
The present state of the evolution recognizes the right of a state to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over defendants who have had
minimum contact with the state. This contact must be "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945). In the instant case the court
used the "fair play and substantial justice" rule in deciding that the
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respondent, having entered into the contract to be performed in this
state, had sufficient contact. This finding is in accord with McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co. 355 U. S. 220, 223 (1957), where the
court said that personal jurisdiction based on "a contract which had
substantial connection" with the state satisfied the requirements of
due process.
The essence of the present view, basing jurisdiction on minimum
contact, is contained in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATION-
AL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03 as prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 1.03 provides
for more expansive jurisdiction than that expressed by our statute
in that it applies to individuals, partnerships, etc., as well as to cor-
porations.
Section 1.03 is identified in the comments to the act as having
been derived "from the Illinois Act." It is interesting to note that
the Illinois Act was the subject of Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone
Co., supra. In that case the court was called upon to decide whether
an Illinois judgment, based on the provisions of their statute should
be given full faith and credit. The court recognized the validity of
the judgment and said "the public policy of this state, though less
comprehensive in scope is in harmony with the public policy evi-
denced by the Illinois statute."
West Virginia is in accord with the weight of authority in this
country in holding that entering into a contract to be performed in
this state subjects a nonresident corporation to the personal juris-
diction of our courts.
Labor Relations-WalshHealey Public Contracts Act
The United States brings this suit against D, a coal dealer, for
alleged violations of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41
U.S.C. § 35 (1936). The act requires that government contracts in
excess of 10,000 dollars be awarded only to contractors who comply
with certain minimum wage and safety requirements for persons em-
ployed by the contractor. It was undisputed that some of D's sup-
pliers, West Virginia mines, failed to comply with the requirements
of the act. The controversy turned on whether "persons employed
by the contractor" included those persons employed by the con-
tractor's suppliers. The United States contended that "employed" was
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intended to be synonymous with "utilized" and the suppliers were,
consequently, included. The trial court dismissed the suit and the
United States appealed. Held, affirmed. The court was guided in
the statutory construction by the literal meaning of the words used
and legislative intent and history. Clearly the contractor was not
intended to be made responsible for its suppliers' compliance with
the act. United States v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 318 F.2d
138 (1st Cir. 1963).
The court gave great weight to the legislative history of the act in
arriving at its decision in this case. It appeared that the act had
undergone substantial redrafting of the area in question. The original
bill required the contractor's suppliers to agree to conform to the
standards of the act. S. 3055, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-A (1935).
The House revision made the contractor liable for it suppliers' com-
pliance, but provided that the contractor could shift liability by
giving the suppliers actual notice of the representations of the con-
tract. H.R. 11554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1936). This revision
was so opposed by the Secretary of Labor and representatives of
labor and business that the bill was again revised. The bill in its
final form was accompanied by the House Report which provided
that "the bill ... has not attempted to ... lay down conditions for
persons furnishing supplies to public contractors." H.R. Rep. No.
2946, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
The United States relied heavily on two provisions of the regula-
tions and rulings. The "substitute manufacturer" provision makes
the contractor jointly liable with a supplier, to whom all or part
of the contract is shifted, for the latter's failure to adhere to the
standards of the act. C.C.H., 2 Wage & Hour Serv. § 26,300.032
(a) (1963).
The application of this provision is limited, by its language, to
manufacturing contracts. The second provision is the "direct ship-
ment" provision. Under this provision a regular dealer's supplier,
who ships the goods contracted for directly to the government, is
made liable. This is true even though the supplier is not a party to
the contract. C.C.H., 2 Wage & Hour Serv. § 26,300.034 (a)
(1963).
The two provisions are clearly inapplicable to the factual situation
in this case and were cited by the United States only to show a
consistant application of the requisites of the act to the contractor's
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suppliers. The court limited the applicability of the two to instances
where the contractor was attempting to avoid his duties under the
act. In the instant case, D's dealings with its suppliers were in the
ordinary course of business for such a contractor. No claim that
the mines were utilized by New England to avoid its duties under
the act was made or proven.
The impact on West Virginia of a contrary holding in this case
is readily apparent. Dealers who contemplated contracts with the
government would of necessity avoid coal produced in non-comply-
ing mines. The only alternative open to dealers would be segregation
of the coal from complying and non-complying mines, an alterna-
tive replete with practical difficulties.
Trade Regulation-Trade Names, Trade-marks, Service Marks
P, the operator of a local insurance agency, brought suit to en-
join D, a nationally known insurance company, from using the word
"Securance" in the conduct of its business. P, in 1956, had incor-
porated as "Securance Services, Inc." and had continuously utiliz-
ed the word "Securance" in its insurance business. This business
was conducted predominately within Sandusky County, Ohio. In
1960 D began to use "Securance" in its national advertising cam-
paign. The trial court dismissed P's suit. The court of appeals en-
joined D's use of the word in Sandusky County. Held, judgment
modified. P had, by prior use, acquired qualified property rights in
the word "Securance." These rights were entitled to protection not
only in the territory where P's business was conducted, but also
throughout the state where, in the probable expansion of business,
he might reasonably expect to attract customers. Younker v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 191 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 1963).
In the principal case P sought to protect the word "Securance"
as a trade name and as a service mark. The court described a ser-
vice mark as a trade-mark identifying a service rather than a pro-
duct. Ohio considers trade names, trade-marks and service marks
as being based on the same principles and subject to the same laws.
The Ohio statutes prescribing the procedure for registration of such
names and marks do not in and of themselves create any rights in
the names or marks. Property rights in the names and marks and
the right to protection of those rights arise as a matter of common
law from their use in connection with a trade or business.
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West Virginia has a statute providing for the registration of trade-
marks. W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 2 (Michie 1961). This statute,
like those in Ohio, creates no rights to the mark registered. Pro-
perty rights in the trade-mark arise from usage and are based on
common law. W. E. Long Co. v. Burdett, 126 S.E.2d 181, 186 (W.
Va. 1962) (dictum). There are no such statutes for trade names
or service marks in West Virginia. Our court has pointed out that
the statute applying to trade-marks is not applicable to trade names.
In this state rights to a trade name arise through the use of the name
in a trade or business. Protection of a trade name is effected by a
suit to enjoin unfair competition at common law. Gluck v. Kaufman,
117 W. Va. 685, 186 S.E. 615 (1936).
As noted, the Ohio court did not hesitate to correlate trade names,
trade-marks and service marks. If the West Virginia court were to
pursue a similar line of thought it seems a fair assumption that the
rationale of Gluck v. Kaufman, supra, would be expansive enough to
embrace service marks.
Ohio holds that rights to trade names, trade-marks and service
marks arise as a matter of common law through usage. These rights
are extended to those areas where it is probable that the user will
expand his business. In West Virginia, however, these rights are
not extended protection or legal recognition on the basis of antici-
pated expansion. The rule appears to be that the rights extend
only to those areas where the user can show he has customers who
are being confused by the duplicity or similarity of trade names.
Gluck v. Kaufman, supra.
Richard Marion Alker
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